Henderson J
IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
HOLDEN IN GEORGE TOWN, GRAND CAYMAN
SCA #24 OF 2006
PETER OLDE
- VS -
REGINA
Reasons for Judgment delivered by The Honourable Mr. Justice Henderson on Monday, December 4, 2006, at George Town, Grand Cayman.
APPEARANCES:
For the APPELLANT: MR. S. HALL-JONES
For the RESPONDENT: MR. G. KEIGHTLEY
PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED ON MONDAY,
DECEMBER 4th, 2006 AT 3:30 P.M.
THE COURT: This is an appeal from a ruling by a learned magistrate in the Summary Court refusing to quash the proceedings. To understand the argument one must first understand the chronology.
The appellant was arrested on February 24th, 2006 for driving under the influence of alcohol. It is conceded that this is an offence for which one may be arrested without warrant.
The following day, February 25th 2006, he was released on what is referred to as "police bail" and ordered to appear before a magistrate on April 26th, 2006. On that latter date, the appellant did attend at the courthouse but nothing at all happened. His name was not on the Court list. The case was not called.
It seems that charges had, in fact, been filed in the registry on the previous day, April 25th, and were date stamped that day. It was through an error that the case did not appear on the list and the defendant did not
therefore appear before a magistrate.
On April 27th, 2006 the error was noticed. The registry issued a summons to the defendant requiring him to appear on May 10th, 2006. That summons was subsequently re-issued and the defendant finally appeared in answer to it on May 28th, 2006. His appearance was under protest and for the purpose of advancing the argument which is now the subject of this appeal.
The time limitation for the prosecution has passed and, therefore, if the appeal were to succeed, the defendant could not be convicted.
The argument is a simple one which turns solely on the wording of section 14(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (2005 revision). That section reads as follows:
Criminal proceedings may be instituted either by the making of a complaint or by the bringing before a magistrate of a person who has been arrested without a warrant.
Mr. Hall-Jones says that the plain and ordinary meaning of those words is that there
are two alternate ways of instituting criminal proceedings. He says the natural meaning of the section is that these two ways are mutually exclusive. If, as happened here, the defendant is arrested without a warrant, he then must be brought before a magistrate for criminal proceedings to be instituted. Section 14(5) provides the procedure in this case. It reads:
When an accused person who has been arrested without a warrant is brought before a magistrate, a formal charge containing a statement of the offence with which the accused is charged shall be signed and presented by the police officer preferring the charge.
That, says Mr. Hall-Jones, is the only way in which criminal proceedings could have been started, given the decision to arrest this appellant without warrant. The alternative of making a complaint and then compelling the attendance of the defendant before the Court by way of summons was not, on this submission, open at all.
No authorities were cited by either party to this appeal.
The logical conclusion of the argument advanced for the appellant is that the procedure for the institution of criminal proceedings not having been brought to completion prior to the expiry of the limitation period, no proceedings can now be pursued.
I see no persuasive reason to read the section as offering two mutually exclusive methods of proceeding. There is no sensible reason why, when an attempt to institute proceedings using one method is made but difficulties are encountered, the authorities should not be permitted to resort to the other method. The language of the section does not preclude such an interpretation. There was no prejudice suffered by this defendant.
In these circumstances, my conclusion is that the two methods provided in section 14(1) for the institution of proceedings are alternatives but they are not mutually exclusive.
It is open to the Crown, having commenced the institution of proceedings in one way but not completed that, to change to the other
alternative method.
For these reasons, the appeal from the ruling is dismissed.
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 3:39 P.M.)