Henderson J
ORIGINAL IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS HOLDEN AT GEORGE TOWN, GRAND CAYMAN 16/5/03 SCA NO. 15/02 BETWEEN: SCOTT STRANG - and - HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Appellant Respondent RULING Delivered by The Honourable Mr. Justice Henderson, on May 16, 2003, in George Town, Grand Cayman. FOR THE RESPONDENT Ms. Smith-Andalcio FOR THE APPELLANT Mr. D. McGrath REPORTED BY: C. ROUSE OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 2. Ruling 5 HENDERSON, J. (Orally): The appellant, Scott A. Strang, brings this sentence appeal from a sentence imposed upon him in the Summary Court for driving while intoxicated. He pleaded guilty to the offence. He has no prior record for such offences. On the day in question, he was found driving his vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of some 265 mg of alcohol for 100 ml of blood, which is more than two and a half times the legal limit of alcohol in blood in the Cayman Islands. The learned Magistrate fined the appellant $500, took note of his participation in the DWI program, took note of his guilty plea and imposed a disqualification from driving for 27 months. It is that latter aspect that is in issue.
Ruling A threshold question is when and in what circumstances this Court should give effect to an appeal from sentence. Where the sentence is wrong in law or in principle, this Court must interfere and correct the error. Where the sentence is clearly excessive, the Court has a jurisdiction to reduce it so that it conforms with other sentencing norms prevalent in the Cayman Islands. On the other hand, it must be remembered that this Court is not the court of first instance on a sentence appeal. It is not open to the Court to simply reconsider all of the facts and impose the sentence which the Court would have imposed had the offender been before the Court in the first instance. I think the Court must pay some deference to experience of the magistrates in the Summary Court and refrain from interfering with sentences unless they are wrong in law or in principle or clearly excessive. Mr. McGrath argues that this sentence is clearly excessive. He also alludes to what he says is an error in principle. He also says that the learned Magistrate, rather than
Ruling exercise her sentencing discretion, simply applied a mathematical rule in order to arrive at the driving disqualification for 27 months. He says that she viewed the case this way: The blood-alcohol reading was about two and a half times the legal limit and, therefore, there should be a disqualification of approximately two and a half times the minimum of 12 months. Having come to that conclusion, she then reduced the disqualification to 27 months to take account of the mitigating factors, the early plea and the participation in the DWI program. It is not an error in law or in principle for a sentencing court to pay heed to what might be called the usual tariff. That is done in many courts and the Court of Appeal from time to time makes reference to that approach. It would be wrong in law or in principle for a sentencing judge to fetter her discretion and apply a mathematical rule in a mechanical fashion while shutting her mind to all of the other factors mitigating or aggravating which she must take into account.
Ruling I am not persuaded that there is anything wrong with a magistrate advertiring to the usual tariff for a driving disqualification providing that she retains the discretion to vary it upwards or downwards in individual cases. I am also not persuaded that the learned Magistrate here fettered her discretion unduly or unlawfully. Indeed, she reduced the disqualification period to take account of the guilty plea and the participation in the program. It follows that there was no error in law or in principle. Is the sentence clearly excessive? The driving disqualification is often referred to as part of the penalty. That is true, but I think it has another and quite likely more significant role to play. It protects the motoring public in the Cayman Islands for the period of time of the disqualification from the danger posed by those who would drive while under the influence of alcohol. When someone chooses to drive his motor vehicle on Christmas Eve with two and a half times the legal limit of alcohol in his blood, I do not consider it clearly excessive
Ruling 1 Or unreasonable to disqualify that person from 2 driving in the Cayman Islands for a period of 3 27 months. For these reasons, the appeal is 4 dismissed. 7 Henderson, J. 8 The Honourable Justice Henderson 13 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 15 Certified correct to the best of my skill and ability, 16 dated the 3rd day of June 2003. Carol Rouse