Sanderson J
IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
HOLDEN IN GEORGE TOWN, GRAND CAYMAN
SUMMARY COURT APPEAL NO. 44 OF 02
TRACY WOODMAN
- VS -
REGINA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE
MR. JUSTICE SANDERSON on the 27th
day of February 2003, George Town, Grand Cayman.
APPEARANCES:
For the APPELLANT: MR. L. FREEMAN
For the CROWN: MR. A. ROBERTS
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2003
SANDERSON, J.:
The defendant, Tracy woodman, appeals her conviction and sentence. She was convicted of possession of cocaine with the intent to supply. The amount involved was small being .37 ounces. She pled not guilty and was convicted after a short trial. She was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. She does not have my criminal record except for some motor vehicle related offences.
In concluding that the defendant was guilty of possession with intent to supply, the learned magistrate said:
"10.69 grams of cocaine base commonly known as crack were involved here. Under the sentencing guidelines any quantity of cocaine base that exceeds four grams is considered serious. Four grams or more attracts a tariff of 10 to 12 years imprisonment. Here the defendant was found in possession of more than twice that
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amount. A reasonable inference is that possession of such a quantum is for the purpose of supply".
In other words, she considered the sentencing guidelines in assisting her to reach the conclusion that the defendant had enough cocaine that it was her intention to supply to others. The other evidence that she referred to in order to fortify her conclusion or to help her reach her conclusion were the negative urine tests of the defendant revealing no cocaine in her body.
There was no other evidence which is typically associated with possession of cocaine with intent to supply. For example there was no significant amounts of cash recovered nor any amounts of cash recovered in denominations sometimes associated with the sale of individual rocks of cocaine. There was no evidence of any drug paraphernalia found on the defendant or at her premises, such as baggies or scales. There was no evidence of individually wrapped rocks of cocaine which would or could indicate a propensity to market or distribute it to others. Nor was there such
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a large quantity of cocaine that it was obvious that she had it in her possession with the intention of supplying others.
I conclude that the learned magistrate's main basis for reaching the conclusion that the defendant had the intention to supply others was her reference to the sentencing guidelines. I conclude in reaching that conclusion on that basis, the learned magistrate fell into error.
In order for the magistrate to conclude that the defendant had possession of cocaine with the intention to supply others, it must be based on the evidence in the case. Accordingly I set aside the conviction of possession of cocaine with the intent to supply.
The defendant has asked for a new trial for possession of cocaine on the basis that new arguments and new avenues could be explored on a second trial. Arguments and avenues that were not explored in the first trial.
The defendant had competent and experienced counsel represent her in the first case. None of the issues, which Mr. Freeman has suggested might be argued in a second trial, could not have been argued during the
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first case if counsel felt it appropriate to do so.
The learned magistrate found as a fact that the defendant was in possession of the cocaine and that particular finding of fact has not been challenged. In essence, Mr. Freeman says that he thinks he can do better the second time around or that counsel could do better the second time around, not necessarily him.
In my opinion, the correct result in this case is to accept the finding of the magistrate after the first trial that the defendant was in possession of cocaine and I observe that this finding is unchallenged.
As I have said, the conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to supply is set aside and I substitute a conviction for possession of cocaine. In other words, simple possession of cocaine.
The appropriate sentence based upon her particular circumstances and the circumstances of this case and reviewing the authorities for possession of small amounts of cocaine would, in my judgment, be four years. I conclude that the appropriate sentencing guidelines are those
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in place at the time of the offence and not
those in place at the time of trial.
Accordingly, I impose a sentence of four years.