Schofield J
IN THE GRAND COURT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
HOLDEN AT GEORGE TOWN, GRAND CAYMAN
CAUSE NO. 177/93
VELMA MAGDALENE BODDEN PLAINTIFF
Administrator of the Estate of
Charles Dudley Bodden (deceased)
v.
TONY JAMES DEFENDANT
Mr. S. McField for the Plaintiff
Mr. G. Hampson for the Defendant
ORDER
Schofield J.
The writ and statement of claim in this suit were filed on 28th April, 1993. The claim is made by Velma Magdalene Bodden the widow and administratrix of the estate of Charles Dudley Bodden, who it is alleged was knocked down and killed by the defendant on 4th January, 1990. It is a claim in negligence made by the personal representative of the deceased person pursuant to Section 3 of the Law of Torts Reform Law.
On this summons to strike out the writ and statement of claim it is argued for the defendant that the suit is time barred. Section 4 (1) of the Law of Torts Reform Law clearly provides that such an action has to be commenced within one year of the death of the deceased person. I must accede to that argument and strike out the action. It seems that the plaintiff has been ill-served by the legal advisors she initially instructed and, reluctantly but inevitably, I must leave her to any remedy she may have against those advisors.
This action became time barred one year after the 4th January, 1990. It is not, therefore, saved by any of the new provisions contained in the Limitation Law, 1991, for that Law did not come into effect until the 15th August, 1991, and it expressly states in Section 44 (2) that nothing in that Law shall
enable any action to be brought which was barred before the date of commencement of the Law.
Counsel for the plaintiff manfully tried to argue that I have an inherent power to extend the time in which suit may be filed.
He points to the exercise of power by the English courts to extend time under the Limitation Act, 1939, and he referred me to the House of Lords decision in Thompson v. Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd. and others [1981] 2 All E R 296 where their Lordships remitted a case to the Judge for him to consider exercising his discretion to direct that the limitation provisions should not apply to the suit. However, the discretion their Lordships directed the Judge to consider exercising was the statutory discretion under section 2D of the Limitation Act, 1939, which is a similar provision to that contained in section 39 of our Limitation Law, 1991. This statutory discretion is not available to me, and Thompson is not authority for the proposition that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to extend a limitation period imposed by statute. Counsel has also referred me to the power to extend the time limit of six months for the obtaining of probate of a will or letters of administration under section 4 of the Succession Law. But again the application for special leave is an application made under the statutory provision which sets the time limit. An extension of time is not a matter of the Court's inherent power.
Finally, Order 3 rule 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court which gives the Court power to extend or abridge time, to which counsel referred me, has no effect upon the statutory time bars for bringing an action. It relates to the enlargement of time fixed in any matter to which the Rules apply.
I have no inherent power to extend the one year time limit for filing action under section 4 (1) of the Law of Torts Reform Law. The action is barred by the operation of express statutory
provision and I cannot take it upon myself to remove that bar.
The defendant is entitled to and will have the orders he seeks in the summons together with costs of the summons and in the suit.
Dated this 6th day of October, 1993