Hull J
IN THE HON.
RT OF THE CAYMAN ISLANDS
HOLDEN
RAND (MR. GEO
BEFORE 228/84
MR. JUSTICE HULL
CASE N
49/14
APP. N
1
ACK FOR
MARGARET ROSELYN DILBERT V. REGINA
WOUNDING
Mr. Po
id f
the appellant.
Mr. Gr 1968.
that
the Crown.
Power cou
as
DECISION
trials
Lat
Ing of appeal against conviction on the ground that the verdict
in theh
now gi rt was unsafe. In other words the ground is substantially
the same legis provided in section 2(1)(a) of the United Kingdom Criminal
Appealent C
hav
o ent
rega a fur contrast， the relevant grounds for appeal from verdicts in
criminion， to resin the Grand Court are similar to those under the earlier
Engl
ion， i.e. that the verdict is unreasonable or cannot be
supponough th
regard to the evidence. The 1968 United Kingdom Act
thereof
ves the Court of Appeal there a wider discretion than
our Co
156， 17
real has. The first question that has occurred to me
in the person
ase is whether， in hearing appeals from the Summary Court，
ve
ies. er right of appeal from this court， sitting in its appellate
jurisdiction
the court of appeal in certain instances.
He
ard to the wide terms in which the appellate jurisdiction of
nt is couched in the Criminal Procedure Code， particularly in
the Gr
section 0 and 172， I think I can do so.
AO. I
is case involves a relatively minor fracas， it has its
diffic
la
Th
out
who first brought it to the attention of the police was
the de
or me
she did so by way of complaint about the conduct of the
complai
al A
hi
he av
is
pen ult
an
ict
ns
police
Mag
2
The lity burdestrate had the advantage of seeing and hearing all the
witnes the came to the judgment that the defendant was at fault. He
has tividence of hearing and determining summary charges
of jusion wa bi crediblity of witnesses and of reaching a summary decision
on thave ref
In matters involving a fras such as this， he has the
respo interf and experience to decide summarily whether self defence
has ar the rad the bounds of reasonable conduct. This court will not
light I think re with his findings of fact. If I were asked to hold that
his d think s unreasonable or could not be supported by the evidence， I
should compla the rised to do so.
ant d paye ner wider consideration whether or not the verdict may be
unsaf alain ant c the following aspects of the evidence are relevant.
that th indinant went to the shop where the defendant worked. A quarrel
at
start usl the defendant， who was the manager， said that she told the complain
ant tic re is miss Suckoo， an employee， also said this. In cross-examination，
the case not see admitted that she was told that， if she didn't leave， the
police fend； had summoned. It reached the point， as I have mentioned， where
the def ant rid call the police.
for
findi of this de defendant used too much force implies that he accepted
that ant who some stage acted in self defence. Miss. Suckoo said that
complas the i ned at the defendant after the police were called， although
she d dar ything.
eviden tant has no previous convictions. The complainant has a
previ comp defen ion for violence.
in my view points strongly towards the fact that it was the
compl he by her conduct incited， or provoked， the disturbance， and
there ar le doubt but that the defendant would not have been charged
with The
ear
learned Magistrate intimated， the case turns on whether or
not the ecisi sent exceeded the legitimate boundaries of self defence.
The ly gdie is that the defendant admitted to the police that she
strucid ng self ed. e alain ant with a piece of wood. It is not in dispute that the
compl ng self e， lained a wound on the left side of her head which caused blood
The
omp
ain
The Sus
kt
he
ain
It was not sufficient for a police officer on arrival to observe the blood on a person's head, and it was sufficient for the complainant to go to the hospital for treatment. Miss Suckoo said that the blood "started to rush" from her head.
Mr. Polack said that the Magistrate failed to address the issue of self-defense in his brief proposition. I think that is wrong. His remarks show that he focuses on the issue. The question is rather whether his disclosed reasons were to the various.
The matter is said that the given reason of the defendant's bigger stature alone is insufficient. I am unable to accept that the precise literal meaning of that broad what the Magistrate meant. He is an experienced Magistrate. He had no evidence that the defendant is a violent woman. I think he meant simply that by defendant was a bigger person, which she herself admitted in cross-examination.
The question is whether or not in all the circumstances the force was exerted by the complainant had no business in the shop after being required to leave an manager. It seems fairly clear that she instigated or provoked the trouble. There is no evidence that the defendant is a violent woman. I hope I am not accused of a double standard, by either feminists or chauvinistic men. The evidence and the Magistrate's findings indicate that she started the fighting. Once it had started I think it is likely that she, distressed and frightened, in her own shop. I think that women are less adept at fighting and less likely to judge the consequences of a blow. Flesh wounds to the head can easily draw blood.
So in any critical sense of the Magistrate, but in the absence of reasons, I feel, overall, that it would be unsafe to sustain this case. Accordingly it will be quashed.
Judge
4th March, 1985